When the question of national identity and survival meets harsh economic realities

After the head of the President's Office, Kyrylo Budanov, confirmed the potential arrival of workers from countries considered to pose higher migration risks, a public backlash and widespread criticism emerged on social media and in the streets. The rivalry between the political left and right, along with accusations of Russian collaboration, escalated into heated debates. But what are Ukrainians really worried about, and how can the situation be regulated?

Foreign workers: a solution or another problem?

The issue came up during a discussion at CEO Club Ukraine, where Budanov spoke about the possibility of attracting workers from countries such as India and Bangladesh.

From a purely economic perspective, the logic is obvious. Ukraine is facing a severe labour shortage. Millions of Ukrainians have left the country since the beginning of the full-scale invasion; many will not return, and mobilisation has further reduced the available workforce. Businesses need people. As Artem Nikishov put it bluntly: “The society does not want them here, but businesses very much do.”

That sentence probably captures the entire contradiction. Ukrainian businesses need workers now. The state needs economic activity, taxes and functioning companies. At the same time, Ukrainian society is already exhausted by war, displacement, mobilisation, corruption and the feeling that the burden of survival is not being distributed equally.

So when people hear that foreign workers may be brought into the country, many do not hear “economic recovery”.

They hear another question: If Ukrainians are being asked to sacrifice their lives for this country, why is the state already preparing to replace their labour with foreign workers?

This may not be what the government intends. But this is how the issue is being perceived by a significant part of society. And ignoring that perception would be a mistake.

The demographic crisis did not start with the full-scale invasion

Ukraine’s demographic problem is not new. The full-scale invasion has simply made it dramatically worse. Millions of Ukrainians have been displaced. Thousands of Ukrainian children have been abducted and deported by Russia. Birth rates have collapsed. Men are being mobilised, while many women and children remain abroad. At the same time, Ukraine is trying to convince its citizens to come back.

But how realistic is that while the war continues? A Ukrainian woman who has spent several years abroad with her children, built a new life, found work and sent her children to school in another country cannot simply be told: Come home, because Ukraine needs you.

Home is not just a geographical point anymore. For many Ukrainians, it has become a question of safety. This is one of the reasons why the discussion about foreign labour cannot be separated from the discussion about Ukrainian citizens returning home.

Israel could be set as an example of a country living during the war. The country has historically developed a strong sense of preparedness: bomb shelters, civil defence, military service and a constant awareness that the state itself must survive.

Ukraine is now experiencing something similar, although under radically different circumstances. We are no longer discussing national identity as an abstract cultural concept. We are discussing whether a nation under existential threat can maintain its demographic, political and cultural core

What does it actually mean to be Ukrainian?

This is where the discussion becomes much more complicated. Ukrainian identity is not simply a passport. It is language, history, culture, memory, territory and a sense of belonging to the same national community.

Dmytro Tkachuk, a Ukrainian author and OUN member, has described Ukrainian nationalism as the protection and development of the Ukrainian nation and its statehood. Whether one agrees with every interpretation of nationalism or not, the fundamental question remains relevant: what exactly are we trying to protect?

Ukraine has already experienced what happens when its national identity is systematically attacked. For decades, Moscow denied Ukraine’s political and historical subjectivity. The Holodomor, repression of Ukrainian intellectuals and artists and forced resettlement to the Gulags are only a few examples of Russia’s intentional attempts to make Ukrainians obey or disappear. The language was repeatedly restricted, and Ukrainian history was rewritten and subordinated to a Russian imperial narrative. The war in the 21st century has become a final arrangement in modern Russia to submit Ukraine to its territories. 

That is why the question of who comes into the country and under what conditions cannot be treated as merely an economic one. A nation fighting for its survival is naturally going to be extremely sensitive to anything that could alter its demographic and political structure. That does not automatically make Ukrainians xenophobic. But it does mean that the government has a responsibility to take these concerns seriously rather than simply dismissing them as intolerance

When disagreement becomes “Russian propaganda”

Some Ukrainian media outlets and public figures have responded to criticism of foreign labour by immediately labelling and separating it into a political category: far-right, conservative, racist, or even pro-Russian.

Nikola Amber, a French-born political activist living in Ukraine, has publicly argued that the country should focus on bringing displaced people home rather than opening the country to large-scale foreign labour migration. His position has been criticised heavily by other journalists and public organisations. 

Amber, who is married to a Ukrainian woman, has disputed that migration should be tightly regulated and that Ukrainian workers should be prioritised. The requirement of mandatory exams on knowledge of Ukrainian history and language was one of the necessary measures to be put in place for foreigners aiming to stay in the country. Explaining his position, Nikola said: “Giving priority to one's own people, one's nation, is not a manifestation of hatred towards any person. This is love in a natural order.” Yet parts of the media campaign against him presented him as part of a broader far-right or Russian-linked narrative. This raises an obvious question:

At what point does criticism of migration become racism, and at what point does accusing every migration critic of racism become a way of avoiding the actual discussion? The distinction matters. When journalists or public figures launch attacks online before engaging with the opposing side's arguments, this could be considered evidence that the notorious ‘cancel culture’ has arrived in Ukraine. 

But if every uncomfortable opinion is immediately described as a Russian narrative, where does legitimate political disagreement go? The status of a democratic country should be proven by the fact that disagreement is actually possible.

The price Ukrainians are already paying

There is another reason in the context worth looking at: mobilisation. At the time, with political elites being involved in corruption affairs, recruitment centres have faced accusations of arbitrary practices, bribery and violence - the picture combined makes it clear that the country treats people like cattle.  

The word “busification” has become part of the Ukrainian political vocabulary. For many Ukrainians, mobilisation has therefore become associated not only with duty but also with fear, humiliation and hopelessness. If quick and convenient decisions about foreign workers could be implemented in Ukraine, then for whom is Ukraine being fought for?

“If men are viewed primarily as a mobilisation resource, women as future taxpayers and demographic units, and veterans as a problem to be managed, while foreign labour migrants are viewed as convenient replacements for vacancies - this is the beginning of a methodical erosion of the national core,” explains public figure and publicist Vladyslav Smirnov. “This is not an argument against foreigners; it is an argument against treating Ukrainians as disposable”, concludes the expert. 

The numbers show that Ukraine, while at war, remains less attractive to foreign workers. For comparison, in 2021 only 3,065 work permits were issued to Indian citizens. In the following year, the number dropped to 657. As of 2025, only 851 permits were granted. The situation with Bangladesh is somewhat different. While 119 work permits were issued in 2021, the number increased to 600 in 2025.

Despite receiving the permit, successful entry to the country remains subject to a final word from a representative of the Border Guard Service. “The task here is to create transparent conditions for attracting people alongside clear algorithms for problems that may arise in the future,” explains Vasyl Voskoboinyk, head of the NGO Migration Policy Office.

What Do Ukrainian Businesses Say?

Foreign labour could provide a quick and logical solution for businesses facing a shortage of workers to cover their production needs. Although hundreds of enterprises are now looking for effective ways to attract employees, not everyone is ready to hire international workers.  

Dmytro Karpenko, CEO of the outsourcing company Fillin, already has several successful cases involving Colombian workers in Ukraine. The positive recruitment experience can partially be explained by social, cultural and religious similarities with Ukraine. In the case of India or Bangladesh, however, the situation may be different. “I am against the possibility of granting [them] citizenship through some simplified system. I worry about Ukrainian identity as much, but if we do everything correctly, then I am not scared of the results." 

But if inviting foreign labour remains controversial, encouraging displaced Ukrainians to return can be twice as hard. While the security factor is crucial to return, recent polls suggest that many are not currently inclined to do so. Dmytro describes his position on the presence of foreign labour in Ukraine as transparent and honest: Ukrainians SHOULD be given priority across all social sectors, but reality suggests that this may not always be actionable.

It is becoming increasingly difficult to fill jobs traditionally held by men, particularly electricians, plumbers and mechanics. A significant shortage of medical workers, including family doctors, general practitioners and paediatricians, is also difficult to address.  

Government Initiatives

Ukraine is trying to bring its people back while continuing to develop digital tools and state registers to provide social support. These systems are also gradually being integrated into the humanitarian response alongside international partners.

According to the strategy, Ukraine must ensure the timely satisfaction of employers' demand for labour and continue the digital transformation of the labour market. The document already proposes to “stimulate the attraction of foreign talent to the Ukrainian labour market.”

Thus, it is not merely a theoretical discussion but an economic necessity. To stimulate labour demand and create favourable conditions for employment, the plan focuses on supporting entrepreneurship development, including veteran-led businesses, social and family enterprises. Active methods for achieving this include entrepreneurship deregulation, consultancy and expanding grant programmes. Providing preferential loans and attracting investment will increase production capacity and increase the number of vacancies to be filled. 

Innovations and digital solutions are at the core of the idea of increasing labour productivity and business competitiveness. In theory, it sounds good. In practice, however, it may be more challenging.

For a country at war, first things must come first. The task is to protect what the country consists of: human capital, sovereignty and unity. Before Ukraine expands large-scale labour migration, an open and comprehensive discussion for a strong legal and political framework must be held. The successful implementation of such heavily depends on political will, 

Those who fear the weakening of Ukrainian national identity argue that the state should more clearly define and protect the role of Ukrainians as the state-forming nation, and establish transparent rules against anti-Ukrainian discrimination. 

Sadly, the problem of Ukrainophobia has not been addressed at the legislative level yet. Disrespect towards the Ukrainian language, culture and people does not carry a criminal offence, as according to many political experts it should. The country has introduced legal protections for Jews and other indigenous peoples. Could similar measures be extended more explicitly to Ukrainians themselves?

Supporters claim that legislation like this would provide necessary protection and legal accountability, given the fact that the denial of Ukraine's national subjectivity has been a central element of Russian propaganda to justify the war.

The nation has always been hospitable and welcoming. Considering the massive international support and assistance Ukraine has received over the years, people do not wish to be portrayed as xenophobes or chauvinists. But historically, the ruling idea was defined centuries ago: Ukrainians must remain the political centre of their own state. 

After all, Ukraine has developed mechanisms to protect the rights of national minorities and indigenous peoples. The challenge now is ensuring that the protection of diversity does not come at the expense of social cohesion or Ukrainians' confidence that they remain at the political, cultural and economic centre of their own state.

If history should teach us something, it is the fact that internal division can be just as destructive as any external pressure. This ought not to be repeated.